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Sacharoff: The Binary Search Doctrine

THE BINARY SEARCH DOCTRINE
LaurentSacharoff'*

I.

INTRODUCTION

When scholars or courts talk about privacy, they often focus on
protecting facts.' Many of the hard privacy questions involve protecting
our web surfing habits from imbedded cookies and banner ads,' our
medical information from the public,3 or our DNA from law
enforcement. 4 The issue of privacy over information looms as one of the
most challenging problems of our time, especially when law
enforcement seeks to capture this information outside the protections or
regulation of the Fourth Amendment.
But this focus on information as the basis for privacy blinds us to
another type of Fourth Amendment privacy: a person's right to solitude
or seclusion, and the right of privacy over a place or area such as the
person, car, or home.5 True, in some instances we can reconfigure this
right to seclusion as simply a desire to protect personal facts: we do not
want the government snooping on what happens in our bedroom because
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas School of Law, Fayetteville; J.D.,
Columbia Law School; B.A., Princeton University. The author would like to thank Ric Simmons,
Sherry F. Colb, Dustin E. Buehler, Donald P. Judges, and, for their invaluable research assistance,
T.W. Brown and Timothy Alexander.
1. E.g., HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE
INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 1 (2010) (seeking the appropriate flow of personal information initially

through the lens of privacy); Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PIIProblem: Privacy anda
New Concept of PersonallyIdentifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1821 (2011); Daniel
J. Solove, Privacy and Power. Computer Databases and Metaphorsfor Information Privacy, 53
STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1424 (2001).
2. NISSENBAUM, supra note 1, at 29.
3. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110

Stat. 1936, 1992; Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 (1977).
4. United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 415-16 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding DNA collection
from arrestees unconstitutional); King v. State, 42 A.3d 549, 580-81 (Md. 2012), rev'd, 133 S. Ct.

1958, 1980 (2013) (same).
5. Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239, 242 (N.H. 1964) (finding that a listening device in
bedroom was an invasion of privacy, though no facts were learned from it).
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it may also learn what we read, or whom we sleep with, both of which
can be stated as facts. But, many aspects of privacy over an area, and our
desire for seclusion, cannot be disaggregated into a collection of facts we
wish to protect, or at least such an attempt fails to capture what we really
care about in protecting privacy for seclusion. Even if we can point to no
concrete fact we wish to hide, we still seek a right of privacy in our
home or other private place, simply for its own sake. This allows us to
relax unobserved and enjoy the sense of dignity and autonomy that
comes simply from this power or choice to retire from the gaze and
scrutiny of others.6
This Article argues that the Fourth Amendment protects not only
informational privacy-not only facts 7 -but also the more ineffable
interest in seclusion in a place or area, especially cars, homes, and
persons.8 It argues that too many court cases atomize privacy into a set
of concrete harms represented by disclosure of discrete facts. 9 Privacy
does protect facts, of course, but it also protects more.
The Court's dog sniff cases present a perfect case study,
encapsulating what Orin Kerr has called the "private facts" model of
privacy.') For example, in Illinois v. Caballes," a state trooper pulled
the defendant over for speeding. 12 As he wrote the ticket, another trooper
arrived and walked his dog around the car until it alerted to the trunk.'134
Based on the alert, the officers searched the trunk and found marijuana.
The defendant argued the initial dog sniff violated the Fourth
Amendment because it was a search of his car without probable cause or
reasonable suspicion.15
The Court rejected his argument, holding that a dog sniff does not
count as a Fourth Amendment search, because it does not reveal any
private fact other than the possession of drugs, and the possession of
6.

E.g., Ruth Gavison, Privacyand the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421,459 (1980).

7. As discussed more fully below, this Article defines information and facts as true
propositions. See infra Part IV.
8. The Court in Katz v. United States famously said that the Fourth Amendment "protects
people, not places," but later rejected this concept as shown in Part II. 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); see
infra Part I.
9. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238-39 (1986) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment protects intimate details only); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984)
(finding that the Fourth Amendment protects legitimately private facts only); United States v. Place,
462 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1983) (same).
10.
(2007).

Orin Kerr, FourModels of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 512-13

11. 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
12. Id. at406.
13. Id.
14.

Id.

15. Id. at 409.
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drugs is not a legitimately private fact.' 6 As the Court put it, a dog sniff
"discloses only the presence or absence of... contraband., 17 This binary
nature has led some courts and scholars to categorize the dog-sniff cases
as examples of the binary search doctrine; a search of an area that only
reveals the presence or absence of contraband does not count as a Fourth
Amendment search.' 8
Caballes involved a car on the open highway, but the police have
expanded their use of drug-sniffing dogs, using them in schools,1 9 for
example, sniffing every locker in a hallway, every car in a parking lot,
and, occasionally, every student as we112 0 -all without any individual
suspicion. More dramatically, a majority of the Federal Circuit Courts of
Appeal addressing the issue have applied the binary search doctrine to
the home, holding that the police may direct a drug-sniffing dog to the
outer door of an apartment or house to sniff for drugs without probable
21
cause or any suspicion.
Of course, the Fourth Amendment does protect places-including
private places and the right to seclusion-when the police
physically invade those areas with a trespass.22 A person's
right to seclusion in his home enjoys broad protection against
the police breaking down doors and simply entering uninvited to search
and seize, and the Court's new trespass test under United States v.
Jones23 will protect against the most obvious and harmful incursions
upon seclusion.
16. Id.at409-10.
17. Id.at 409 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S 696, 707 (1983)) (internal quotations
omitted).
18. United States v. Colyer, 878 F.2d 469, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (discussing the "binary
nature" of the search); State v. Rabb, 920 So. 2d 1175, 1190 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) ("[A] binary
search, which reveals only the presence or absence of contraband, is never a search for purposes of
the Fourth Amendment."); Ric Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprintfor Adapting the Fourth
Amendment to Twenty-First Century Technologies, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1303, 1349-50 (2002).
19. Nate Schweber, Drug-Sniffing Dogs PatrolMore Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2009, at
3 (reporting that random dog sniffs of lockers and cars have become "increasingly common in
public schools" in the Northeast).
20. Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91, 92 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding that a dog sniff of all 2780
students was not a search). But see B.C. v. Plumas Unified Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d 1260, 1266 (9th Cir.
1999) (finding a dog sniff of high school students from close proximity to be a search).
21. United States v. Scott, 610 F.3d 1009, 1016 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that a dog sniff from
outside the front door of an apartment did not constitute a search); United States v. Brock, 417 F.3d
692, 695-96 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that a dog sniff outside of a locked bedroom door did not
constitute a search); United States v. Reed, 141 F.3d 644, 649 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that a dog
sniff of dresser drawers by a dog already lawfully in the apartment did not constitute a search). But
see United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1367 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that a dog sniff from
outside the front door of an apartment is a search).
22. United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
23. 132 S.Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
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But the trespass test protects against physical intrusions only, and
therefore provides no protection against remote surveillance. When that
remote surveillance involves dog sniffs, and perhaps other binary
searches, the desire to protect privacy in seclusion for its own sake
requires us to develop a conception of privacy that involves more than
trespass on the one hand, and the protection of discrete facts on the
other. In other words, the right to seclusion protects a place, as does
trespass, but when the surveillance involves no physical intrusion, it
protects privacy, even though the surveillance reveals no legitimately
private discrete facts.
The Court's most recent dog-sniff case reinforces this point. In
Florida v. Jardines,24 the police brought a drug-sniffing dog onto a
person's front yard and porch where the dog alerted to marijuana within
the home. The Court held that this conduct constituted a Fourth
Amendment search-not because of what the sniff revealed about the
interior of the home, but because the police trespassed upon the home's
curtilage, its yard, and porch, in order to effect the dog sniff.2 6 In other
words, the Court evaded the original question presented to it: does a dog
sniff of the home itself, as a remote type of surVeillance, constitute a
search? 27 If, for example, the police bring a drug-sniffing dog to the door
of an apartment, not having trespassed to arrive there, does the sniff of
the interior of that apartment count as a Fourth Amendment search?
Jardines leaves this question open, but Caballes suggests the conduct
does not count as a search. 8 I argue that a proper understanding of
privacy in the home requires us to find that such dog sniffs count as
Fourth Amendment searches, even absent trespass.
Outside dog sniffs, the binary search doctrine potentially blesses
searches of a person's computer hard drive for child pornography
without any suspicion, using a technique known as hash values.29 The
search is binary because the hash reveals nothing about the computer's

24. 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).
25. Id. at 1413.
26. Id.at 1415, 1417-18.
27. See id. at 1414; Brief for Petitioner at i, id. (No. 11-564) ("QUESTION PRESENTED:
Whether a dog sniff at the front door of a suspected grow house by a trained drug-detection dog is a
Fourth Amendment search requiring probable cause?").
28. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409-10 (2005).
29. United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 781 (7th Cir. 2010) (describing the technique). A
hash is an algorithm that returns for each computer file a practically unique value that can be
compared to the value of known images or videos of child pornography. If the hash values match,
the file is child pornography. The hash value is not truly unique, but practically so, since the
chances that two files will share the same hash value stands at 1 / (2 ^1 2 8). Richard P. Salgado,
Fourth Amendment Search and the Power of the Hash, 119 HARV. L. REV. 38, 39, 42, 46 (2005).
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files other than the presence or absence of contraband. 30 As with
Jardines,a trespass test might solve the problem if the hash value search
involves an electronic trespass; but, courts are sharply divided about
whether an electronic invasion of another's computer actually does
constitute a trespass. 3' If not, we must again rely upon a privacy concern
in protecting our hard drives from these initial government intrusions.
This Article reorients our thinking about privacy by establishing a
right to seclusion or privacy under the Fourth Amendment in an area
such as the person, car, or home for its own sake. It makes the corollary
claim that dog sniffs should be considered Fourth Amendment searches.
Part II, therefore, uses the dog sniff cases 32 as a case study, examining
closely their justification and ramifications.33 Part III then contrasts these
cases with the Court's cases that do recognize place or area as deserving
of Fourth Amendment protection for its own sake, such as Kyllo v.
United States. 34 Kyllo held that the Fourth Amendment protects the
home even if no intimate facts are disclosed. Part III also addresses the
Court's drug-testing cases, 35 which recognize that a blood, urine, or
breath test for drugs or alcohol counts as a Fourth Amendment search, in
part because we value the integrity of the body for its own sake.3 6
Part IV surveys privacy scholarship and philosophy.3 7 Though some
scholars premise a right to privacy on the value in protecting facts,38
many other scholars expressly recognize a right to39 seclusion to further
such interests as dignity, relaxation, and autonomy.
Finally, Part V employs Fourth Amendment values that lie
somewhat outside the concept of privacy, but perhaps best illustrate why
30. Salgado, supra note 29, at 44 (arguing the Court's dog sniff cases would allow authorities
to search hard drives for known child pornography without a warrant). But see Marcia Hofmann,
Arguing for Suppression of 'Hash' Evidence, 33 CHAMPION 20, 21-23 (2009) (arguing that the
Court's dog sniff cases would not allow authorities to search hard drives).
31. See, e.g., McLeodUSA Telecomm. Serv. v. Qwest Corp., 469 F. Supp. 2d 677,703 (N.D.
Iowa 2007) (finding that electrons can trespass); Compuserve Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F.
Supp. 1015, 1021 (S.D. Ohio 1977) (noting that a spammer's electronic signals are "sufficiently
physically tangible to support a trespass cause of action"); Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 301,
311 (Cal. 2003) (holding that a former employee sending bulk email over plaintiff's servers was not
a trespass since it did not impair the server's functioning).
32. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410; City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000);
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1983).
33. See infra Part 1l.
34. 533 U.S. 27 (2001); see infra Part I1.A-B.
35. E.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 633-34 (1989).
36. Id. at 616-17; see infra Part III.C.
37. See infra Part IV.
38. Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475,482-83 (1968); W.A. Parent, Privacy, Morality,
and the Law, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 269, 269-70 (1983).
39. JUDITH WAGNER DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF PRIVACY: LAW, ETHICS, AND THE RISE OF
TECHNOLOGY 18, 20, 48 (1997); Gavison, supra note 6, at 423,435.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2014

5

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 5

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:1139

we care about seclusion in certain places beyond protecting identifiable
facts .40 For example, the text of the Fourth Amendment does not refer to
privacy, but rather, ensures that a person is "secure. ' AI Secure means
more than privacy and even more than simply the right to physically
exclude, and includes the feeling of security, that is, being free from fear
or apprehension of danger. Consider a real dog sniff under this standard,
a routine traffic stop suddenly altered when an aggressive German
Shepherd, often cross-trained to take down suspects, 2 begins to sniff the
car, including or perhaps especially, near the open window near the
driver.43 These dogs, also capable of physically extracting a driver from
a car, can certainly create the fear or apprehension of danger in the
driver, and thus, intrude upon his Fourth Amendment security in his car
and person. 44 Part V elaborates on this almost entirely neglected concept
of "secure" under the Fourth Amendment.45
Part VI considers further ramifications of the binary search doctrine
as well as a model of privacy rooted in protecting facts only, in
particular, the use of hash values to locate child pornography on
computer hard drives.46
Nothing in this Article denies that protection of personal facts and
data should play a central role in the right to privacy, whether statutory
or constitutional. But, alongside that right stands the right to seclusion.
The value in this type of privacy lies in the choice to be alone, the sense
of security, and a feeling of dignity as against those who would intrude
upon our personal space.

40. See infra Part V.
41. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
").
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ....
42. United States v. Reed, 141 F.3d 644, 647 (6th Cir. 1998) (indicating that the dog, Cheddy,
was cross-trained to find suspects and drugs); State v. Reed, No. M2008-01850-CCA-R3-CD, slip
op. at 10 n.2 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2009). The International Association of Chiefs of Police National
Law Enforcement Policy Center has issued a model policy and white paper on the use of dogs for
apprehending suspects, as well as finding drugs. See generally IACP NATIONAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT POLICY CENTER, LAW ENFORCEMENT CANINES (2001). The white paper also

recommends that officers use more docile breeds of dogs that will only be used to detect narcotics to
avoid unnecessary bites. Id. at 5-7.
43. See, e.g., United States v. Sharpe, 689 F.3d 616, 617-18 (6th Cir. 2012) (collecting such
cases as a dog sniffing outside a car and suddenly jumping into it); United States v. Lyons, 486 F.3d
367, 369-70 (8th Cir. 2007) (describing how a dog stuck its head into a car window left open by the
driver); United States v. Stone, 866 F.2d 359, 361 (10th Cir. 1989) (discussing a dog that jumped in
an open hatchback).
44. See, e.g., Kerr v. City of West Palm Beach, 875 F.2d 1546, 1549-50 (11th Cir. 1989)
(describing serious injuries that can result from the city's use of German Shepherds to apprehend
suspects by repeatedly biting their arms, legs, or any available body part).
45. See infra Part V.A.
46. See infra Part VI.
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II.

JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE BINARY SEARCH DOCTRINE

The hard Fourth Amendment cases involving new surveillance
techniques, including dog sniffs for drugs, require the Court to decide
which techniques count as a "search" under that provision. If the
technique does not count as a search, the Fourth Amendment provides
no protection, and the police may use the technique without any
individualized suspicion and with complete discretion unguided by
policies or regulation, assuming no other provision or statute governs the
practice. This threshold inquiry therefore operates as a crucial on-off
switch for Fourth Amendment protection.
Absent physical trespass, police conduct counts as a Fourth
Amendment search if it invades a person's reasonable expectation of
privacy.47 This Part discusses how the Court has applied that test to dog
sniffs and other binary searches.
A.

Place to Caballes

The Court's justification for excluding dog sniffs from Fourth
Amendment coverage has evolved from a multi-factored analysis to
what we might call the "pure binary search doctrine." In the first main
case, United States v. Place,48 DEA agents subjected the defendant's
luggage to a dog sniff.49 The Court held that the sniff was not a search
under the Fourth Amendment based on two main factors: (1) a dog sniff
reveals the presence or absence of contraband only;5 ° and (2) the manner
of dog sniffs is generally not intrusive. 5' Likewise, in City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond,52 the Court said that a dog sniff of a car
for drugs during a traffic checkpoint was not a search based on the same
two factors.53

47. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). The Court augmented the privacy test
with a trespass test in United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012).
48. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
49. Id at 699.
50. Id. at 707. Many lower courts and some scholars infer a third factor from the first factor: a
drug-sniffing dog alert with close to 100% accuracy. See, e.g., United States v. Waltzer, 682 F.2d
370, 372 (2d Cir. 1982); William C. Heffeman, FourthAmendment Privacy Interests, 92 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1, 74 (2001). Place does not expressly rely upon such a finding, and according to
Caballes, that is no longer a factor. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005); Place, 462
U.S. at 707. As discussed below, the dog's accuracy plays a role in whether a positive alert
establishes probable cause, but plays a far less significant role in determining whether the sniff is a
search. See infra Part III.B.
51. Place,462 U.S. at 707.
52. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
53. Id. at 40.
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But subsequently in Caballes, the Court appeared to rely entirely
upon the first justification, that dog sniffs reveal only the presence or
absence of contraband.14 In that case, the police directed a dog to sniff a
car pulled over for speeding. 5 5 In holding the sniff was not a search,
Caballes did not expressly jettison the other rationale-that the manner
of dog sniffs is relatively unintrusive-but its language makes somewhat
clear that the first justification suffices because it relied so heavily on the
nature of the facts disclosed and not upon the manner of the search.56
Caballes, therefore, appears to establish a pure form of the binary
search doctrine,57 under which a dog sniff does not count as a search
solely because it does not reveal any private or personal facts other than
the possession of contraband.
B. The Home and Jardines
The binary search doctrine has taken on new urgency as numerous
courts have applied the doctrine to the home, allowing the police to
bring dogs to the door of an apartment or house to sniff for drugs
within.18 Some courts, such as the Sixth Circuit, have read Caballes as
creating a pure binary search doctrine, excluding intrusiveness from the
equation. In upholding a dog sniff of dresser drawers once the police
were validly within a home, the Sixth Circuit held that the location does
not matter as long as the sniff reveals no (legitimate) private fact. 59
Unlike the majority of Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal, however,
the Florida Supreme Court held that a dog sniff of a home, at least on
those facts, counted as a Fourth Amendment search.60 In doing so, the
Florida court deviated in two important respects from Caballes: first, it
54. Caballes, 543 U.S. at410.
55. Id. at 406.
56. Id. at 409-10.
57. Ric Simmons, The Two Unanswered Questions of Illinois v. Caballes: How to Make the
World Safe for Binary Searches, 80 TUL. L. REv. 411, 414-17 (2005) (arguing that even earlier
cases, such as Place, created a pure version of the binary search doctrine, and that the Court should
focus on results and not the manner of the search).
58. United States v. Scott, 610 F.3d 1009, 1012, 1016 (8th Cir. 2010) (describing a dog sniff
from outside the front door of an apartment); United States v. Brock, 417 F.3d 692, 693-94, 696
(7th Cir. 2005) (discussing a dog sniff of a locked bedroom door); United States v. Reed, 141 F.3d
644, 649-50 (6th Cir. 1998) (describing a dog sniff of dresser drawers by a dog already lawfully in
the apartment); United States v. Colyer, 878 F.2d 469, 472-77 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (discussing a dog
sniff of a train sleeper compartment); cf United States v. Lingenfelter, 997 F.2d 632, 637-39 (9th
Cir. 1993) (discussing a dog sniff outside a warehouse). But see United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d
1359, 1366-67 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding that a dog sniff from outside the front door of an apartment
was not permissible).
59. Reed, 141 F.3d at 650 ("[T]he location of the contraband [is] irrelevant ... .
60. Jardines v. State, 73 So. 3d 34, 49 (Fla. 2011), af'd on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 1409
(2013).
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considered the level of intrusiveness; and second, it acknowledged the
possibility of police abuse. That is, it rejected the pure version of the
binary search doctrine.
Even though the Supreme Court affirmed the Florida court on
different grounds, it is useful to consider in depth the Florida opinion,
since it provides important perspective on the binary search doctrine; in
particular, it relied heavily upon intrusiveness, a factor apparently absent
in Caballes.6' The facts in Jardines, as described by the Florida court,
were as follows: based on a tip, numerous law enforcement agencies
coordinated an elaborate procedure that involved many police vehicles,
officers, and, of course, the dog itself, Franky.62 The Court described a
surveillance procedure that ran the length of the block and lasted for
hours, a "public spectacle" that everyone on the street could see.63 As
part of this procedure, a police dog handler and dog went onto Jardines'
porch where the dog sniffed and alerted for marijuana within, leading to
a search warrant, search, and arrest.64 The Court assessed not merely the
dog sniff in isolation, but the entirety of the long procedure, and
concluded that the procedure not only involved public humiliation and
embarrassment for the defendant, but worse, "an official accusation of a
crime.' 65 Therefore, it was a Fourth Amendment search.66
The Court distinguished this level of intrusion from that present on
the facts of the leading Supreme Court cases. In Place, it noted that the
police dog merely sniffed a person's luggage, and did so away from its
owner so that no one at the airport would link the luggage with the
owner. 67 In Edmond and Caballes, the Florida court described the traffic
stops as minimally intrusive because the defendants, within their cars,
"retained a degree of anonymity., 68 Jardines, by contrast, enjoyed
little anonymity as a result of this extended public spectacle on his
residential street.69
The Florida court also noted that allowing police to conduct dog
sniffs of homes without any level of suspicion could lead to police using

61. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409 ("Any intrusion on respondent's privacy expectations does not
rise to the level of a constitutionally cognizable infringement."); Jardines,73 So. 3d. at 45-46, 4849, 52-53.
62. Jardines,73 So. 3d at 37, 48.
63. Id. at 48.
64. Id. at 37-38.
65. Id. at 48.
66. Id.at 49.
67. Id. at 44-45.
68. Id.at 45.
69. Below, I argue that even the traffic stop dog sniff involves sufficient humiliation and
public attention to warrant some Fourth Amendment protection. See infra Part V.B.1.
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the sniffs in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner.7 ° It noted that in
Place and Caballes, the police already had reasonable suspicion for the
seizures leading to the dog sniffs, and such suspicion would limit
police discretion.71 In Edmond, the Court required police to follow
protocols to ensure against discriminatory or arbitrary stops of cars that
would similarly reduce abuse at the search stage.72 No such protections
existed in Jardines.
The Florida court nicely distinguished Caballes and the other dog
sniff cases on their facts, but the question remains whether the principle
in Caballes admits of such distinctions. That is, if we read Caballesas a
pure binary search case, as a case that baldly asserts that conduct that
reveals no personal or private fact cannot count as a search, regardless of
the intrusiveness of the method, or any other potential problems such as
profiling, then the factors Jardines relies upon to distinguish that case
are out of bounds.
1. Jardinesin the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court affirmed the Florida court, holding the dog
sniff to be a search, but on the separate rationale of trespass.73 Under the
Court's recent jurisprudence, if the police commit a physical invasion
akin to trespass as part of an investigation, that conduct constitutes a
Fourth Amendment search, aside from whether it invades a reasonable
expectation of privacy.74 As noted above, in Jardines,the police walked
up the front path of Jardines' home with a drug-sniffing dog and spent a
short time on the porch where the dog performed a sniffing ritual before
alerting. 75 The front path, and the porch in particular, form part of a
home's curtilage, treated under Fourth Amendment analysis as
tantamount to the home itself.76 Any entrance to such an area normally
constitutes trespass unless the person has license to enter, and such
license can be implicit in society's custom.
The case, therefore, hinged on whether the police have an implicit
license to enter the front path and porch with a drug-sniffing dog to
conduct an investigation. The majority decided no.77 It conceded that
Girl Scouts, peddlers, and others enjoy implicit consent to enter those

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Jardines,63 So. 3d at 36.
Id. at45.
Id.
Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409,1417-18 (2013).
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
Jardines, 133 S.Ct. at 1413.
Id. at 1414.
Id. at 1417.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol42/iss4/5

10

Sacharoff: The Binary Search Doctrine

2014]

THE BINARY SEARCH DOCTRINE

areas, knock on a door, and ask to sell their goods.78 But, the police in79
this case entered with a different purpose: to find evidence of a crime.
At least when they enter with such a purpose with dogs to sniff on the
porch, they enjoy no such license; rather, a homeowner seeing someone
entering his property with drug-sniffing dogs "would inspire most of us
to-well, call the police. 8 °
The Court, thus, sidestepped the harder question: whether a dog
sniff of a home that does not involve a physical invasion or trespass
counts as an invasion of a reasonable expectation of privacy, and, thus, a
search. Justice Kagan in her concurrence argued yes; 8' Justice Alito in
his dissent argued no, relying on Caballes.82 The case parallels Jones,
where the Court held that a GPS device attached to a person's car counts
as a search because of the physical trespass.83 By relying upon trespass,
the Jones case left unanswered the harder, privacy question: whether the
police can conduct a Fourth Amendment search if they use advanced
technology to follow a person for weeks without any physical invasion.
Read together, Jardinesand Caballes may construct an unfortunate
two-tiered regime: those who live in homes with a front yard or porch
enjoy Fourth Amendment protection against drug-sniffing dogs; those
who live in apartments and public housing units with common areas that
the police may freely enter-particularly those labeled "high crime"-do
not. 84 A majority of Circuit Courts have found no reasonable expectation
of privacy in apartment hallways, 85 and those who live in public housing
have no expectation of privacy in the hallways.86 In apartment buildings
with high crime, landlords will often give consent to police entry. 87 On
the other hand, in wealthier apartment complexes, especially with
doormen, police will not be able to enter common hallways,88 and, again,
they will not be able to enter front yards or porches of houses.
Admittedly, the case law is split. Based upon the foregoing
principles, for example, the court in United States v. Deleon-Bayardo89
78. Id. at 1415.
79. Id.at 1416.
80. Id.
81. Id.at 1418-19 (Kagan, J., concurring).
82. Id.at 1425-26 (Alito, J., dissenting).
83. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
84. United States v. Mendoza, 281 F.3d 712, 715 (8th Cir. 2002).
85. United States v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239, 1242 (9th Cir. 1993) (collecting cases that have
reached this conclusion).
86. People v. Grier, 552 N.Y.S.2d 383, 384 (App. Div. 1990).
87. See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 551 F.2d 760, 764 (8th Cir. 1977).
88. Even in high-security apartments, however, law enforcement may sometimes gain
entrance to common areas. Nohara,3 F.3d at 1240-42.
89. No. 07-99, 2008 WL 141761 (D. Minn. Jan. 14, 2008).
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held that the police who entered an apartment hallway to conduct a dog
sniff outside defendant's apartment door did not conduct a Fourth
Amendment search. 90 Other courts, however, have applied Jardines to
apartments to find protection. 9' Either way, in public housing and
apartment buildings in which the landlord gives consent, Jardines is
unlikely to provide protection against dogs in common hallway areas
outside apartments. Since a great many of the dog sniff residence cases
involve such apartments rather than houses,92 a trespass rationale alone
could give rise to disparities in race and wealth for dog sniffs of
residences without warrant or probable cause.93 This Article, therefore,
provides a crucial supplement to Jardines; even absent trespass, such a
dog sniff of a home (or car) constitutes a search since it invades a
person's reasonable expectation of privacy.
III.

PLACE IN FouRTH AMENDMENT LAW

The dog sniff cases have largely ignored the value of privacy in an
area such as the car or home for its own sake, and have relied instead on
a model of privacy that protects concrete personal facts only. This Part
surveys how the Supreme Court has treated Fourth Amendment
94
protection of place-first in its early cases, second in Arizona v. Hicks
and Kyllo, and finally in the drug testing
cases such as Skinner v.
95
Railway Labor Executives'Association.
A.

Seesawing History

The Court's treatment of place in Fourth Amendment law has
seesawed over time. The Framers of the Fourth Amendment relied, in
large part, on several key precedents in England and the colonies that all
90. See id. at *2-3; see also United States v. Scott, 610 F.3d 1009, 1015-16 (8th Cir. 2010)
(holding that a dog sniff of an apartment door from the hallway does not constitute a Fourth
Amendment search).
91. E.g., McClintock v. State, 405 S.W.3d 277, 283-84 (Tex. App. 2013); see also United
States v. Jackson, 728 F.3d 367, 373-74 (4th Cir. 2013) (suggesting that if a trash can had been
sitting near the apartment's back door within the "apartment's curtilage," Jardines would have
protected that area from police intrusion); United States v. Davis, No. 12-CR-95-LRR, 2013 WL
1635867, at *3 (N.D. Iowa Apr. 16, 2013) (noting that Jardines "may call into question" police
right to bring a drug-sniffing dog to an apartment door).
92. E.g., Fitzgerald v. State, 864 A.2d 1006, 1017 (Md. 2004); State v. Davis, 732 N.W.2d
173, 181-82 (Minn. 2007); State v. Ortiz, 600 N.W.2d 805, 812 (Neb. 1999); People v. Dunn, 564
N.E.2d 1054, 1055 (N.Y. 1990); see also United States v. Villegas, 495 F.3d 761, 767-69 (7th Cir.
2007) (holding that warrantless entry of a duplex's common hallway did not violate the Fourth
Amendment).
93. See supra notes 84-88.
94. 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
95. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
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involved traditional physical searches of houses, persons, papers, and
effects.96 The physical search of a home was so obviously a search, and
the home so obviously a place, that the question of what conduct
constituted a search, and what role place played, did not arise. In
England, the King's messengers searched the houses and businesses of
dissident writers and their printers, and arrested them all on general
warrants that named no persons or places to be searched. 97 In the
colonies, customs agents and others searched houses, ships, and
warehouses for undutied goods.9 8 In all the cases the government
physically trespassed and conducted what were obviously searches, long
before newer investigative techniques brought into question what a
"search" meant.
The Fourth Amendment incorporated the principles developed in
opposition to these unreasonable searches, and made clear these
principles apply to places, as well as facts or information. Its text lists
places such as houses, persons, and effects, and expressly mentions
"place" in the warrant clause, requiring that any search warrant describe
with particularity the "place" to be searched. 99 Beyond place, the text
makes clear it protects information not only because a chief reason to
protect an area such as the house is to protect information, but also
because it expressly protects "papers."100
But in one of the first Fourth Amendment cases, Boyd v. United
States,1 °1 the Court did not require any physical intrusion or trespass by
the government into a private place, such as the home or a person's
pockets as a premise to finding a search. 10 2 In Boyd, the government
subpoenaed documents to build a forfeiture case, similar enough to a
criminal case to trigger Fourth Amendment protections. 10 3 Even though
the government proceeded by subpoena rather than any physical search,
the Court considered the subpoena sufficiently similar in function and
10 4
effect to a physical search to count as a Fourth Amendment search.
Because the subpoena involved papers, also specified by name in the
96. See, e.g., Paxton's Case, 1 Quincy 51, 52, 55 n.15, 57 (Mass. 1761) (discussing searches
of houses, warehouses, and ships); Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 807-08 (K.B.)
(involving government officials forcibly entering a person's house, breaking open his locks, and
seizing his papers); Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 490 (K.B.) (same).
97. Entick, 95 Eng. Rep. at 810; Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 490, 494; WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE
FouRTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING 602-1791, at 148-49, 151-52 (2009).
98. E.g., CUDDIHY, supranote 97, at 236-41.
99.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

100. Id.
101. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
102. Id.at 622.
103. Id. at618,634.
104. Id. at 634-35.
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text of the Fourth Amendment, we can understand more readily why the
Court did not need to find that the government had conducted a physical
search of a place.
The Court later withdrew from this expansive view of a
Fourth Amendment search in the 1928 wiretapping case, Olmstead v.
United States. °5 There, prohibition officers set up wiretaps on the
phone lines outside the defendants' homes and transcribed
months of conversations concerning criminal liquor activities.' °6 The
defendants sought to0 7exclude the evidence as an illegal search under the
Fourth Amendment.
Under Boyd, the conduct would likely have counted as a search.
The government intercepted communications, which are very analogous
to papers, such as letters. Though the wiretapping involved no physical
trespass on defendant's property, neither did the conduct in Boyd. But,
the Court rejected the analogy to papers, and particularly, the analogy to
the government opening someone's mail, holding that the wiretaps were
not searches for two reasons: first, the agents did not search or seize
anything tangible; and second, the agents did not physically invade or
trespass upon the property of the defendants. 0 8 In the years following
Olmstead, the Court did not develop a clear rule for what counted as a
search, sometimes relying on a test focused on place and physical
intrusion and other times rejecting it.' 0 9
Nevertheless, in 1967, the seesaw swung back, and away from an
emphasis on place, in Katz v. United States."0 There the Court overruled
Olmstead and held that electronic eavesdropping, even without a
physical invasion, constituted a "search" under the Fourth
Amendment."' The Court held that the Fourth Amendment protects
privacy in general
and did not require the invasion of a constitutionally
2
area.1
protected
The majority in Katz decoupled Fourth Amendment privacy from
any particular area when it famously stated: "The Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places."' 1 3 This notion that the Fourth Amendment
protects privacy in some free-floating way, irrespective of place, quickly
105. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
106. Id. at456-57.
107. Id.at 462.
108. Id.at 464-65.
109. Orin S. Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth Amendment Searches, 2013 SUP. CT. REV.
67, 82-86 (2013).
110. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
111. Id.at353.
112. Id.
113. Id.at351.
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runs into conceptual difficulty, however. If the police, for example,
interview a spouse and ask him very personal and private information
about his wife, and the husband discloses these secrets, the police have
invaded the wife's privacy, but they certainly have not conducted a
"search" under the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, the police will learn
personal and private details about suspects without invading their
privacy in the normal sense of the term, without seeming to veer even
close to the concerns of the Fourth Amendment.
These examples show that the Fourth Amendment will almost
necessarily have some connection to an area or place. Indeed, Justice
Harlan in his concurrence in Katz rejected the majority's view that area
no longer mattered; he argued, instead, that the phone booth was a
constitutionally protected area because Katz had essentially rented it out
as he would a hotel room. 1 4 Since the Court soon adopted Harlan's
concurrence as its test for privacy, we should also acknowledge his view
of the continuing importance of place.
The final shift came in 2012 when the Court in Jones expressly
established a trespass test, holding that if the police trespassed upon a
constitutionally protected area in looking for something, that conduct
counts as a Fourth Amendment search, whether or not it also invades a
reasonable expectation of privacy." 5 The Court expressly retained the
privacy test for non-trespass cases, but the6 decision goes far to
reconnecting the Fourth Amendment to place. 11
B. Hicks andKyllo
Jones represents the culmination of several cases written by Justice
Scalia that emphasize the importance of place. In these cases he relies on
the text of the Constitution, and perhaps on his general desire to place at
least some reliance on the common law of 1791.117 Either way, the cases
both connect the Fourth Amendment to place as they broaden Fourth
Amendment protection by expanding what counts as a search. In Hicks
and Kyllo, the Court further cements the privacy of place by
affording privacy protection even when no concrete information is

114. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
115. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012).
116. Id.at 949, 952.
117. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (stating that the Fourth Amendment
protects the interior of the home "with roots deep in the common law"). On the other hand, in Kyllo,
Scalia recognized that the common law cannot answer all questions concerning new technology,
and noted that courts must "take the long view, from the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment
forward." Id. at 38-40 (emphasis added).
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or might be revealed, thus recognizing privacy over place beyond
informational privacy.
In Hicks, a police officer was validly in an apartment to search for
weapons or gunshot victims and came across a turntable.' 1 8 He thought it
might be stolen so he moved it so he could see its serial number, either
turning it around or upside down.11 9 The serial number revealed it was
120
stolen, leading to Hicks' arrest and motion to suppress the evidence.
The Court held the police officer had conducted a search, but not
because he learned any information, personal or otherwise. 121 The Court
noted that a serial number is not important or personal, but it also noted
that even if there had been no serial number under the turntable, the
action would constitute a search. 122 It is the private area underneath the
turntable that the Fourth Amendment protects 123 and not any particular
even if it happens
facts that might be learned there. "A search is a search
124
to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable."'
Similarly, in Kyllo, the Court put special emphasis on the area
searched and not upon the information learned. In that case, federal
agents suspected Kyllo was growing marijuana in his home. 125 They
therefore trained a thermal imaging device to the outside of his house,
and discovered that the garage roof and one side of the house were hotter
than the rest of the house and other homes in the triplex. 126 Based on this
heat difference, as well as utility bills and tips, they obtained a warrant
plants in Kyllo's house. 127 Kyllo moved to
and discovered marijuana
128
drugs.
the
suppress
The Court held that the agents had conducted a warrantless search
of Kyllo's house when they used the thermal imaging device. 129 The
Court did not rely upon the facts learned, but rather, emphasized that the
home is special, indeed sacred. 3 ° The Court conceded the only fact
learned was that the garage roof and one side of the house were hotter
118. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 323 (1987).
119. Id.
120. Id.at 323-24.
121. Id.
at324-25.
122. Id.
at 325.
123. In light of the new trespass test under Jones, a court could also find a search based upon a
trespass to chattel, namely, the turntable. But, in Hicks, the Court clearly relied upon a privacy
rationale. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 325.
124. Id
125. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001).

126. Id. at 29-30.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 30.
Id.
Id.at 34-35, 40.
Id.at 37.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol42/iss4/5

16

Sacharoff: The Binary Search Doctrine

2014]

THE BINARYSEARCHDOCTRINE

than other areas and that this fact was "unimportant" (not to mention
outside the home). 131 But the nature of the facts didn't matter, the area
did. As Scalia put it: "The Fourth Amendment's protection of the home
to measurement of the quality or quantity of
has never been tied 32
information obtained.'
Of course, at times, the Court in Kyllo did speak of facts and
information since ultimately what the government learned, as in Hicks,
were facts, such as the relative heat of certain areas or the inference that
the person inside was growing marijuana. As a result, the Court phrased
its holding in terms of information, stating that the government conducts
a search when it learns information about the inside of the home it could
not have learned-absent the technology-without going inside,133 But,
in a criminal case, the court will always be addressing factual
information the government seeks to introduce into evidence, or that was
used to obtain a warrant. However, that question differs from whether
the Fourth Amendment protects only facts, or personal facts, or also
protects areas.
Kyllo says that the Fourth Amendment protects the home as an
area, with the result that any fact learned from within--even a fact of
criminal activity-becomes private because it is in the home. 13 4 That fact
takes its character not from its inherent nature-for example, there are
marijuana plants within-but rather from the area it describes: activity
within the home. That is, even if the activity is criminal, it enjoys
protection because it occurs in the home. "In the home, our cases show,
all details are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from
prying government eyes." 3 Some read this quote to mean that the
Fourth Amendment protects intimate details only, and that all details of
the home are intimate. But really, what it means is that we can deem
even non-intimate facts intimate because they are in the home; or rather,
the area is protected and not particular facts. After all, as a matter of fact
not all details of the home are intimate; as the Court noted in Kyllo,
whether a closet light is on is not intimate; a rug just inside the door is
not intimate; nevertheless, we deem them intimate because of where they
are, which is really another way of saying the area itself is protected. It
questions the entire approach of breaking privacy protections down into
identifiable facts.

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at40.
Id. at 37.
Id. at40.
Id. at37.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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But the greatest confusion has come from Scalia's somewhat stray,
but vivid, remark that has taken on a life of its own. Those who have
interpreted Kyllo as having relied on a model of privacy that protects
intimate details have pointed to, and endlessly repeated, the hypothetical
of the sauna. The thermal imager, according to the Court, "might
disclose, for example, at what hour each night the lady of the house
takes her daily sauna and bath-a detail that many would consider
intimate."'' 36 The Court in Caballes misread this statement to mean: (1)
the thermal imager actually did detect such intimate details; or at least
(2) that its ability to detect such intimate details was critical to the Kyllo
Court's holding.137 Dozens of cases and
some scholars have followed
138
this misunderstanding of the quotation.
First, the thermal imager did not, in this case, reveal such a fact. All
it revealed was the relative heat of certain exterior walls that led to the
inference of grow lights, not a sauna. 139 The Court largely concedes that
the presence of grow lights is not intimate, comparing it to a policeman
who pushes a few inches into the home and sees nothing but the
"nonintimate rug on the vestibule floor."'' 40 The intrusion is a search
under the Fourth Amendment not because of the fact learned, but
because of the area intruded upon.
Second, even if the imager were merely capable of revealing such
an intimate detail, Caballes misconstrues the remark by ignoring its
context. The sauna quote comes as part of Scalia's argument that the
Fourth Amendment is not limited to protecting intimate details. That is,
the dissent proposed that thermal imaging could count as a search, but
only when it reveals intimate details.'14 The dissent's test would not
measure whether a given technology in a given case had actually
revealed intimate details, but rather, whether it would be capable of
doing so. The Court rejected this test-after all, sophisticated technology
may fail to disclose intimate details and unsophisticated technology
might succeed in doing so. The Court then used the thermal imager in

136. Id. at 38 (internal quotation marks omitted).
137. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409-10 (2005).
138. E.g., United States v. Brock, 417 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2005); People v. Jones, 755
N.w.2d 224, 230 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008); Mark E. Smith, Going to the Dogs: Evaluatingthe Proper
Standardfor Narcotic Detector Dog Searches of PrivateResidences, 46 Hous. L. REV. 103, 109-10
(2009) (reading Kyllo as holding that using the thermal imager was a search because it could reveal
"intimate details," and quoting the sauna remark). But see Timothy C. MacDonnell, Orwellian
Ramifications: The ContrabandException to the Fourth Amendment, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 299, 31617 (2010).

139. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29-30.
140. Id. at 37.
141. Id. at 44 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Kyllo as an example-that imager was relatively unsophisticated and yet
it could, in theory, disclose intimate facts, such as sauna habits, whereas
more sophisticated technology might not be able to--showing that the
dissent's use of sophistication as a proxy for disclosing intimate details
would not yield accurate results, even if we were to use a test based on
whether the surveillance disclosed intimate detail. 142 Thus, the sauna
remark means exactly the opposite of what some have said since Scalia
uses it to reject a rule that would be based on whether the technology
could reveal intimate details or not. Again, what mattered to the Court
was the area-the home-and not what details were revealed or even
could be revealed.
No doubt Kyllo presented a tough case for Caballes because if the
Fourth Amendment protects areas rather than facts only, the car will
receive at least some protection. The Court in Caballes could have
drawn this distinction, perhaps, that the car simply enjoys less protection
than the home, and it could have pointed to language in Kyllo
emphasizing the home's special protection; but it did not. Rather, it
focused on facts, that a dog sniff reveals only one fact, whether a person
possesses contraband, and this fact enjoys no privacy protection.
Caballes thus relied upon the sauna remark to mischaracterize
Kyllo as a personal facts case, saying that "critical" to the decision 1in
43
Kyllo was that the thermal imager could reveal "intimate details.'
Again, Kyllo meant the exact opposite.
Scalia wrote the majority opinion for both Hicks and Kyllo, cases
that use area to establish bright-line Fourth Amendment protections.
These cases were consistent with his general philosophy in two ways:
first, to provide bright-line rules to police in the field; and second, to
glean those bright-line rules from the common law. 144 As for the second,
in Kyllo, he emphasizes the common law roots of the protection of the
area of the home from even a small or technical invasion. 145
It is, therefore, not surprising that Scalia also wrote the recent GPS
case, Jones, holding that even a technical trespass on a protected area
such as the car, no matter how small an invasion, will result in a finding
of a Fourth Amendment search. 146 In Jones, the government put a small
GPS device on the undercarriage of defendant's car in order to follow
his movements at all times for twenty-eight days. 147 The government
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409-10 (2005).
Id.
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 (majority opinion); Arizona v. Hicks 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987).
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
Id. at 948.
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argued this was not a search, but the Court disagreed, holding that a
trespass, however slight, if in aid of discovering information, counts as a
search.148 Notice the role both area and information play in the Jones
case. The trespass occurs on an area (a car here). The Court makes no
inquiry into whether intimate facts, or even any facts, were disclosed, or
even likely to be disclosed-surely no facts were disclosed concerning
the interior of the car or its bottom.
C. Drug Testing Cases
The drug testing cases present another challenge to the binary
search doctrine since they are themselves practically binary searchesyet count as Fourth Amendment searches. The Court has addressed
government programs that require drug or alcohol testing of certain
employees by blood, breath, or urine, and consistently held that each
type of test constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. 149 Urine
and breath tests are particularly germane because, like dog sniffs, they
do not physically intrude into a person's body, but rather permit the
government to infer whether someone has taken drugs or alcohol from
what has emanated from within the body, if emanate is the right word to
describe urinating and breathing.
The Court addressed such tests in Skinner.'50 If a railway employee
was involved in a train accident, federal regulations required blood and
urine tests; if an employee violated certain safety rules, the regulations
for
authorized breath and urine tests.' 5' If the employee tested positive
152
him.
fired
usually
railway
the
alcohol,
or
drugs
of
amount
any
The Court treated each type of test-blood, breath, and urineseparately, finding that each constituted a search despite varying levels
of intrusion. The first type, blood tests, were easily denominated
searches. A blood test physically intrudes, penetrating beneath the skin,
and therefore violates a person's reasonable expectation of privacy. 153
The Court also referenced "security," noting that it must consider the
question "in light of our society's concern for the security of one's
the
person."' 54 In addition to the blood draw, the Court held that
"ensuing chemical analysis" effected a further privacy invasion.155

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id.at 950.
E.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-18 (1989).
489 U.S. 602, 609-11 (1989).
Id.at 609, 611.
Id. at 606-07, 629-30.
Id. at616.
Id.
Id.
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When the Court turned to the breath test, it likewise found a privacy
violation, even though the government does not physically intrude upon
the body as with a blood test.156 Both, the Court said, implicate "similar
concerns about bodily integrity."' 57 The Court emphasized that the
procedure required a person to produce a "'deep lung' breath for
chemical analysis."'' 58 The Court evidently considered the process to be a
physical intrusion into the body, perhaps akin to requiring a person to
empty his pockets.
The Court did, however, note that collecting a urine sample differed
from a blood draw, since the former does not involve a "surgical
intrusion into the body."' 159 Nevertheless, the Court held that requiring a
urine sample invaded a reasonable expectation of privacy for two
reasons: first, the chemical analysis of the urine can reveal private
60
medical facts about a person such as epilepsy, pregnancy, or diabetes;
and second, urinating is a particularly private activity, and requiring a
urine sample, especially when it involves visual or aural monitoring,
implicates privacy.'61
Once the Court held that the tests were searches, it also found that
the government did not need probable cause and a warrant to conduct
them, in part because the government62 interest in a safe railroad was high
and the intrusion of the test limited.
Subsequent drug testing cases likewise held urine drug tests to be
searches when required of customs agents, 163 students,' 64 candidates for
office, 65 and hospital patients, 166 and these simply cited or quoted
Skinner without further discussion. In Chandler v. Miller,167 for
example, the state of Georgia required candidates for certain offices to
certify they have taken and passed a drug test. 68 The statute permitted
the candidate to produce the urine sample in his doctor's office before
sending it to an independent lab, and the69candidate received the results
first and could control further disclosure. 1
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 616-18.
Id. at 616-17.
Id. at 616.
Id. at 617.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 633-34.
Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989).
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995).
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313 (1997).
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 76 (2001).
520 U.S. 305 (1997).
Id.at 308-09.
Id.at312.
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The Court in Chandler held that the required urine test was a
search, even though it lacked the key invasive features mentioned in
Skinner. 70 First, the candidate could produce the urine in the privacy of
his doctor's office, without the visual or aural monitoring mentioned in
Skinner.1 71 Second, an independent lab tested for drugs only and
provided the results to the candidate, who controlled any further
disclosure, unlike the hypothesis in Skinner that a urine test
other than drug use, such as diabetes,
could disclose information
72
pregnancy, or epilepsy. 1
These drug testing cases all find privacy interest in the human body,
not solely because of the information revealed, but also because privacy
protects the integrity of the body for its own sake. The body is a place
listed in the Fourth Amendment ("persons") just as are houses and, in
case law, cars. These latter places, when subjected to dog sniffs,
therefore bear similarities to the drug testing cases discussed below.
1. Similarities and Differences
The similarities between a dog sniff and the drug tests are
straightforward. In both cases, the test results disclose the presence or
absence of contraband only. 173 In both cases, at least with urine and
breath tests, the government does not physically intrude into the interior
of the area at issue-the home, car, or person for dog sniffs, and the
interior of the human body for drug tests. In both cases, in light of
Chandler, the government does not directly observe the person urinating
in the drug test case or living in the home in the dog sniff case; in
Chandler the government simply receives the information about drug
positivity just as a dog sniff would return, and the person has even more
control since she can withhold the result.
But, we can identify differences as well. In the drug testing cases,
and alcohol breathalyzer cases, the person is required to produce
something from the inside of his body, and thus, the test might resemble
a police order to empty one's pockets. This argument is tricky, however,
because we all breathe and urinate all the time, and, in fact, cannot help
but do so. The police could, in theory, collect our urine once we have
finally succumbed and urinated, or test the air near where we breathe.
170. Id. at313.
171. Id. at 312; Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989).
172. Chandler,520 U.S. at 312; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617.
173. Indeed, the Court in Skinner made precisely this point. Though a search, the tests were,
according to the Skinner Court, a minor intrusion-in large part because they revealed the presence
or absence of contraband only. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625-26. The breath tests, for example, "reveal
the level of alcohol in the employee's bloodstream and nothing more." Id. at 625. The breath tests
"reveal no other facts in which the employee has a substantial privacy interest." Id. at 626.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol42/iss4/5

22

Sacharoff: The Binary Search Doctrine

2014]

THE BINARY SEARCH DOCTRINE

Indeed, certain breath tests now allow the police to do just that: to test
the air a person naturally breathes out. 174 Thus, this difference does not
seem significant.
The other difference is that when the government collects a urine or
blood sample, it could, in theory, retain the sample and test it for all sorts
of things other than drugs, including such personal matters as pregnancy.
This does seem to be a real difference from a dog sniff; the potential for
other testing does seem an additional incursion of privacy. But in none
of the drug cases was this subsequent search a realistic possibility. In
Chandler, for example, an independent lab tested the samples and
provided the results to the candidate only. 175 More to the point, the Court
did not, in the end, place much reliance on this potential since in
discussing reasonableness, the Court in
Skinner noted that the tests
76
1
only.
contraband
of
presence
the
reveal
Our privacy interest in our blood, breath, and urine seems to relate
not to the information potentially gained but to a far more important
value, bodily integrity. Blood constitutes our very essence, carrying
oxygen, hormones, and antibodies through the body; it signifies life and
death, in metaphor and film. A bloody protest is a deadly one. To share
blood, to be consanguine, is to be family. Our breath is our spirit; words
like "spirit," "inspire," and "expire" come from the Latin spirare, to
breathe. Urine, though less lofty, represents
another type of human
177
value, the value in hiding the beastly.
All three, blood, urine, and breath, are highly personal and intimate,
even once they leave the body. We avoid touching another's blood, we
hide our urine and dispose of it as quickly as possible, and we avoid
getting close enough to breathe another's breath unless we enjoy an
intimate relationship with that person. Our breath in particular creates a
small zone of privacy directly around our faces; someone who
comes close enough to breathe it is a "creep;" someone who gets in our
face is a "challenge."
In sum, a dog sniff, particularly in close proximity to a person, even
a person in a car, exhibits a similar intrusion upon privacy as blood,
urine, and particularly breath tests, and all of these methods of drugs
tests have been clearly held to be searches under the Fourth Amendment.
These drug testing cases challenge the dog sniff cases, and demonstrate

174. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 2.2(h), at 549-53 (4th ed. 2004).
175.

Chandler,520 U.S. at 312.

176. Id. at 313, 323; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625-26.
177.

See FERDINAND DAVID SCHOEMAN, PRIVACY AND SOCIAL FREEDOM 16-17 (1992).
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how they ignore bodily integrity in particular, and the value of seclusion
in an area in general.
D.

Tort Privacy

In assessing privacy under the Fourth Amendment, the Court rarely
draws on state tort privacy law. 178 But tort privacy sheds important light
on the notion that privacy, including privacy under the Fourth
Amendment, protects areas as well as facts. In fact, the right to privacy
as a tort has deep roots in the right to seclusion, and one strand of tort
privacy protects specifically against "intrusion upon seclusion." The tort
focuses on the physical intrusion, and protects not only against an
intrusion upon a person's "private affairs or concerns," but also simply
upon his solitude or seclusion. The express language of the tort, as well
as many of the key precedential examples, illustrate a desire simply to
protect physical solitude or seclusion.
For example, perhaps the first privacy tort case, though not using
that term, was De May v. Roberts, 79 decided in 1881.180 In that case, a
couple called their country doctor late at night to come deliver their
baby. 18 1 The doctor arrived with a friend, Scattergood, providing no
explanation for his presence.182 The couple assumed he was associated
with the medical profession and allowed him in. 8 3 He ended up
witnessing the birth. 184 The couple sued and the court awarded
damages. 185 The couple's consent to his entry was wrought by deceit
and, therefore, void. 86 The court did not say whether the case was one
of battery or trespass, but today it stands for invasion of privacy and, in
particular, intrusion upon seclusion.'8 7 One could try to wrestle its facts
into his model, implying that Scattergood observed concrete facts; but,
178. E.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,
40 (2001); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 614-16. One court has noted that the reasonableness inquiry under
the Fourth Amendment differs from the analogous inquiry under the state privacy tort. Wilcher v.
City of Wilmington, 139 F.3d 366, 379-80 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding that urine drug tests including
visual monitoring were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, but that a separate inquiry was
required under state privacy law).
179. 9N.W. 146 (Mich. 1881).
180. Id. at 146.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. at 146-47.
Id. at 147.
Id.
Id. at 148.

185. Id. at 149.
186. Id.
187. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b (1977). But see DAN B. DOBBS ET AL.,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 580 (2d ed. 2011) (arguing "recovery could have been justified on a trespass

theory as well as any other").
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of course, the situation is better described without reference to the
specific facts he may have learned. The harm lies simply in his intrusion
upon seclusion, his invasion of a private area in which an unclothed
woman was giving birth.
In another canonical case,188 a landlord hid a microphone behind
the headboard of a couple's rented room in order to listen to their
conversation. 8 9 He never heard anything, and, of course, disclosed no
private facts about the couple.1 90 Nevertheless, the New Hampshire
Supreme Court held that the landlord had intruded upon the seclusion of
the couple and ordered that damages be awarded.' 9'
Another case that captures the essence of intrusion as opposed to
disclosure of facts arose when a doctor took a picture of a dying patient
against his will. 192 The doctor had no desire to publish the photograph or
use it in teaching interns; rather, he simply meant to keep it in his
files. 93 As a result, the photograph would show nothing more, and
reveal no other facts than what the doctor had observed in person.
Nevertheless, the Maine Supreme Court held that the taking of the
photograph violated the man's right to privacy. 194
These cases all fall under the strand of privacy known in the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS as intrusion upon seclusion. 95 Its
formulation shows that it protects more than simply facts, because it
prohibits highly offensive intrusions into "the solitude or seclusion
of another or his private affairs or concerns." 96 Private affairs or
concerns seem to capture personal facts, while solitude or seclusion
remain for their own sake. It also expressly protects more than
physical intrusions, including wiretapping, eavesdropping, 197 and, as
noted above, photographing.
IV.

PHILOSOPHY OF PRIVACY

As noted in the Introduction, a great deal of recent privacy
scholarship and court cases have focused on private facts because the
growing use of data collection-whether from our web surfing habits or

188. Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239 (N.H. 1964).
189. Id.at 240.
190. Id.at 242.
191. Id.
192. Estate of Berthiaume v. Pratt, 365 A.2d 792, 793 (Me. 1976).
193. Id.
194. Id.at 794-95.
195.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).

196. Id.
197. Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 770-71 (N.Y. 1970).
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concerning medical information-has made disclosure of such often
highly personal facts extremely problematic. 198 For this reason and
others, many scholars who consider the more philosophical aspects of
privacy have likewise focused on privacy as a right that protects
personal, and often intimate, facts. But, much scholarship on privacy
also argues that privacy protects areas and the right to seclusion.
Sometimes these arguments come in the context of an argument in favor
of recognizing a right to contraception, abortion, and sexual liberty
as a strand of privacy, and area, therefore, plays an important role; but
others simply recognize that privacy protects physical seclusion for its
own sake.
For the purposes of this discussion, when I refer to information or
facts, I mean a true or false proposition. A central example of a personal
fact would be HIV status, which of course can be stated in the form of a
proposition: "George is HIV positive." Other examples would include
statements such as: "William is having sex with Zoe," or "Alice makes
$150,000 per year." Though I contrast with the disclosure of personal
facts the protection of seclusion or area, one could, in theory, reduce
every aspect of that seclusion to a set of facts, but those facts would fail
to capture the person's desire for seclusion. That is, a person often seeks
seclusion without seeking to hide any facts.
A.

PersonalFacts

Alan Westin's definition and discussion of privacy from his book,
PRIVACY AND FREEDOM, written in 1967, has proved very influential in

addressing the already pervasive use by the government and others of
modem surveillance techniques, including data collection and usage. 199
He defined privacy as "the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to
determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information
about them is communicated to others. 20 ° On the surface, this definition
seems to relate primarily to facts, and in discussing some of the
functions of privacy, Westin does, in fact, emphasize facts. For example,
he argues that privacy protects a person's autonomy to keep secret
certain "ultimate" and "intimate secrets. 20 1
But Westin's theory, upon closer examination, involves far more
than simply the protection of personal facts. Westin emphasizes that
individuals play different roles and wear different "mask[s]" in different
198.
199.
200.
201.

See supra Part1.
ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967).
Id.
Id at33.
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social contexts.2 °2 When a person plays a certain role, but hides another
part of himself, he takes advantage of a type of privacy to develop his
personality. Even more, when a person seeks seclusion, either total
isolation or the sanctuary of close family members, he does so to avoid
the need to play the more taxing roles required in larger society.
Westin describes this as "emotional release," as a time needed "off
stage" to be himself, and privacy and seclusion afford that time.20 3 A
person's desire to relax at home and be himself is far better described as
a desire for seclusion to be by himself, rather than as a desire to hide
certain personal facts.
On the other hand, William Parent truly does argue that privacy
only protects facts-those facts that are personal and essentially secret to
some extent, what he calls "undocumented. ' ,2°4 This is his definition of
the state or condition of privacy, not the right to privacy. That is, if no
one knows whether Andy missed work because of a hangover, he enjoys
privacy over this fact; if the newspaper publishes the fact, he no longer
enjoys privacy. Parent expressly ties his definition to the increased threat
technology presents to the privacy of personal data.2 °5 The right to
privacy relates to whether others have a duty to avoid revealing
information that lies in a state of privacy.
With his focus on information, intrusion upon seclusion presents a
problem for Parent, which he addresses in two ways. First, he argues that
it is still a valid tort and should be legally cognizable, but that it should
' 20 6
not be ranked as part of a unified or coherent concept of "privacy. ,'
Second, he argues many seclusion cases could still fall under his
definition of privacy, because we can often identify personal facts that
the intrusion upon seclusion reveal.20 7 To the extent the intrusion does
disclose personal facts, it invades privacy.
If intrusion upon seclusion remains a viable legal action in Parent's
view, who cares whether we call it privacy or not? The problem
seems to be this: Parent argues that the Fourth Amendment protects
"privacy" and there is, therefore, the danger that a Court will import
wholesale his limited notion of privacy to the separate context of the
Fourth Amendment.20 8

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id. at 33-34.
Id.at 34-35 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Parent, supranote 38, at 269-71.
Id.at 270-71.
Id.at 283-86.

207.

Id. at 285-86.

208. Id. at 287-88.
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Richard Posner maintains an unsentimental view of privacy. He
argues that privacy protects personal facts, but finds little to celebrate
about such secrecy, since, in his view, people keep secrets in order to
manipulate others.20 9
One of the most interesting theories of privacy is that of Charles
Fried, who emphasizes that privacy protects personal facts. 210 Fried
argues that the heart of privacy is the right to control such personal facts
from disclosure. 211 This right, in turn, furthers interpersonal
relationships. By creating certain information that is private, and over
which a person has control over disclosure, we give people the tools to
create intimate relationships since they can selectively disclose this
personal and private information only to a select few in the inner circle
of intimacy. Privacy thus turns certain personal information into a type
of "capital" that a person can spend on creating a personal relationship.
Fried's view focuses on information and the way we can share it,
but it seems adaptable to seclusion as well: we may wish to exclude
everyone from our bedroom but our partner, and there do the most
intimate things in order to establish the relationship itself. We can thus
treat seclusion as capital, just as he argues we treat private information
as capital. Even this revised version of Fried does seem to miss another
aspect of seclusion, which is our desire for isolation from everyone.
Sometimes we just want to be alone. This desire might include the
obvious withdrawal behind a closed door of a bathroom. But it also
includes everyone's desire for solitude for no concrete reason at all. The
desire for seclusion, like the desire for privacy, can include individual
seclusion as well as group seclusion; each protects not information, but
the desire not to be seen, touched, or otherwise sensed by others, and the
desire simply to avoid the physical proximity of others.
David Schoeman builds upon Fried's view of relationships, that
privacy can foster them, but he separates out a different kind of privacy,
the type that protects certain bathroom activities. 21 2 We individually
want the first kind of privacy to foster relationships by allowing us to
have something special to share, as well as to keep the information
private within that group. But the privacy of bathroom activities does not
foster relationships-we generally do not share those in order to build
relationships, and, in fact, we are required to keep those matters private

209.
210.
211.
212.

Id.at 277.
Fried, supranote 38, at 482-83.
Id.
SCHOEMAN, supranote 177, at 15-16.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol42/iss4/5

28

Sacharoff: The Binary Search Doctrine

2014]

THE BINARY SEARCH DOCTRINE

even if we wished to share them. This second type of privacy protects
protecting us from public association with the
human dignity "by 213
unclean.,
the
beastly,
B. Beyond PersonalFacts
On the other hand, many philosophers, in defining privacy, flatly
reject the requirement of, or emphasis on, personal facts. They recognize
that personal facts form an important type of privacy, but argue that
privacy also protects seclusion. For example, Judith Wagner DeCew
argues that privacy protects three overlapping interests: (1) informational
214
privacy; (2) accessibility privacy; and (3) expressive privacy.
Informational privacy, of course, embraces the type emphasized by
others above, and expressive privacy includes the decisional privacy
exemplified by the contraception2 1 5 and abortion cases.21 6 It is the
accessibility to privacy that captures the right to seclusion important in
the dog sniff cases. That subtype includes seclusion for sexual and
217
bathroom activities, "that social norms already prescribe as private.
in private
But it also protects against physical closeness or surveillance
21 8
scrutiny.,
overbearing
of
"fear
cause
can
that
or public
DeCew applies this type of accessibility privacy to drug testing.
She acknowledges the binary nature of such tests, but argues that
even a blood test that discloses only the presence or absence of
contraband violates this type of accessibility privacy. 219 She argues
many of the drug testing cases
give too little weight to the physical
220
intrusion upon bodily integrity.
Similarly, Ruth Gavison rejects those who restrict privacy to
informational privacy, though she notes, "the most lively privacy issue
now discussed is that related to information-gathering., 221 Technology
has led to new ways in which informational privacy is invaded, but
physical access privacy is invaded largely the same way as before.
Like DeCew, Gavison recognizes protection of information but also
protection of seclusion; though unlike DeCew she would exclude

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id.at 17.
DECEW, supra note 39, at 75-78.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
DECEW, supra note 39, at 76.
Id.
Id.at 137.
Id.
Gavison, supra note 6, at 429.
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Griswold-type privacy.122 Thus, her main categories of privacy are
"secrecy, anonymity, and solitude. 223 She describes the perfect state or
condition of privacy as a person on an island: "no one has any
information about X, no one pays any attention to X, and no one has
physical access to X.,,2 24 To the degree this perfect state is diminished,
privacy is diminished.
In assessing solitude, or what she also calls "physical access," we
must consider whether a person is close enough to touch or whether the
person is close enough to observe through ordinary senses. 225 Such
privacy, she says, relates not to information learned but
to the loss of
226
aloneness: "our spatial aloneness has been diminished.,
She applies the distinction between informational privacy and
solitude to assess what privacy remains for those committing crimes and
capture in general the distinction this Article draws.227 That is, few
would support informational privacy for a person committing a crime,
but rather would reject the criminal's interest in keeping secret his
criminal activity. But when we phrase his interest as the interest we all
have in seclusion, we see that this privacy interest remains, even for the
criminal. After all, "solitude and anonymity [are] related not only to the
wish to conceal some kinds of information, but also to
needs such as
221
inhibition.,
from
freedom
and
concentration,
relaxation,
229
Finally, Edward Bloustein premises a right to privacy on dignity.
In large part, he responds to William Prosser's attempt to identify for
each type of privacy a concrete, measurable harm such as mental distress
or damage to reputation. Bloustein argues Prosser's mission misses the
more fundamental interest at stake, the interest in human dignity. 230 A

man, Bloustein writes, whose home may be entered at will, "is less of a
man." 231 Though Bloustein considers dignity the central value of
privacy, I consider dignity below as a Fourth Amendment value separate
from privacy.

222. Id.at 428-29, 433-39.
223. Id.at 428.
224. Id.
225. Id.at433.
226. Id.
227. Id.at 435-36.
228. Id.at 435.
229. Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean
Prosser,39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 973-74 (1964).
230. Id.
231. Id.
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C. Conclusions on Privacy Scholars
The foregoing represents merely a small sample of the privacy
scholarship, viewed through a prism that divides it into theories that
focus on information versus those that also recognize the importance of
seclusion for its own sake. We can easily justify a right to privacy over
information: we may seek privacy to discuss dissent or unpopular
politics, engage in special religious rituals that require secrecy, or
discuss embarrassing medical questions with our doctor. Privacy over
information allows us to engage in a variety of important practices and
behavior that society recognizes and values.
Privacy over an area and seclusion for its own sake, on the other
hand, present a greater challenge to justify in such simple terms when no
information is involved, but it seems idiosyncratic to exclude from
privacy the socially central concept of seclusion. To say that what we do
in the bathroom is not protected by privacy simply excludes this
important and central use of that term. The simple, or seemingly simple,
desire of a teenager to be left alone in his bedroom, not to hide some
loathsome fact, but simply to be alone, must surely rank as central to any
notion of privacy.
One way to capture the ineffable value in seclusion may lie in
recognizing that dignity alone is an important subset of privacy, as
Gavison argues, or perhaps one of its driving forces, as Bloustein argues.
But dignity seems distinct from privacy in many contexts, since it
involves a sense of self-worth. Therefore, below I consider dignity
separate from privacy as an independent value protected by the
Fourth Amendment.
Also, we must remember that much privacy scholarship discusses
privacy as a general concept not necessarily limited by the text or history
of the Fourth Amendment. Though these scholars sometimes take their
discussion of privacy and apply it wholesale to the Fourth Amendment,
as if that Amendment were congruent with the concept of privacy.
V.

BEYOND PRIVACY

This Article has argued that the dog sniff cases rely upon a narrow
notion of privacy that solely protects personal facts and ignores the other
strand of privacy that protects seclusion in an area for its own sake, even
if no personal facts are disclosed. Our reasons for protecting seclusion
for its own sake become even more clear when we move beyond any
concept of privacy to embrace other core Fourth Amendment values.
Perhaps these values are simply another way of illuminating privacy
interests, but they seem better explicated, at least under different labels.
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Most important, the text of the Fourth Amendment does not
mention privacy, but seeks to make people "secure" in their homes and
persons. Below, I will show how the concept of security applies
particularly well to dog sniffs and helps to show the Fourth Amendment
harm that arises from them.
The Fourth Amendment also protects interests closely related to
security, such as personal dignity against humiliation by authorities. I
explore this idea below. Finally, the Fourth Amendment ought to play a
role in limiting certain abusive police practices, such as dragnet
searches, unlimited
police discretion, and racial profiling-all implicated
232
by dog sniffs.
All these concepts-security, dignity, limiting discretion, and racial
profiling-must still be seen in reference to some area or thing
mentioned in the Fourth Amendment. That is, the Fourth Amendment
does not protect a person's security or dignity in all contexts; rather, it
protects these interests when the police conduct an investigation that has
some connection or reference to a person, house, paper, or effectwhich nowadays includes cars.
As a consequence, these additional values of security, dignity, etc.,
help show why privacy in an area for its own sake is important, even
aside from any personal information that may be protected. This Part,
therefore, continues the theme that the Fourth Amendment protects
against more than simply legitimate personal information, and embraces
the protection of persons and places for their own sake in order to
promote a person's sense of security, their dignity, etc., and to reduce the
risk of racial profiling.
A.

"Secure"

The text of the Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of the
people to be "secure." Secure means "free from danger ...or attack" as
in "a securefortress.', 233 Based on this definition, some have argued that
the term secure in the Fourth Amendment means the right to exclude
only. 234 Viewing secure as equivalent to the right to exclude seems to
adopt a pure trespass view of the Fourth Amendment.
232. See Lewis R. Katz & Aaron P. Golembiewski, Curbing the Dog: Extending the Protection
of the Fourth Amendment to Police Drug Dogs, 85 NEB. L. REv. 735, 748-50 (2007); Dan Hinkel &
Joe Mahr, Drug Dogs Often Wrong: Police Canines Can Fall Short, but Observers Cite Residue
and Poor Training as Factors, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 6, 2011, § 1, at 1, 10. One could see racial profiling
as violating an individual and a collective right.
233.

2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 66 (1828).

234. Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy, or
Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 307, 351-66 (1998).
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But scholars, viewing secure as the right to exclude only, have
missed another closely related definition of secure that helps us breathe
life into the term; for secure also means "free from fear or anxiety," as in
"he felt secure in his old job., 235 The Oxford English Dictionary shows
that this second meaning, "feeling no care or apprehension," has been in
use since the Sixteenth Century.2 36 Noah Webster's 1828 dictionary
likewise defines secure not only as free
from danger, but also as "free
237
danger.,
of
apprehension
or
fear
from
We should not go so far as to interpret secure as meaning free from
anxiety in all its forms, including keeping a person secure in his job;
after all, the Fourth Amendment matches secure with houses, persons,
papers and effects, a correspondence that limits its meaning. But, we can
read secure to mean more than simply the right to exclude and include
the fear or anxiety that this right to exclude will be breached. Essentially,
secure is the right to be free from trespass or the threat of trespass or
some other physical danger, and is analogous to the relation between
assault and battery. Assault protects a person's fear of danger, the danger
of a physical trespass such as battery or false imprisonment, and the tort
of assault plays an important role in our sense of physical security. The
same applies to searches and physical trespass to places other than the
person, such as cars and homes. This view of secure as a feeling, albeit
one still closely tied to the places and things described in the Fourth
Amendment, as well as to some threat of trespass, helps us to see that the
Fourth Amendment protects against more than actual trespass.
Whether the Framers and Ratifiers of the Fourth Amendment
believed "secure" in the Fourth Amendment embraced this broader
meaning will have to await further study. For the purposes of this
Article, I assume that secure under the Fourth Amendment includes this
feeling of being secure against serious threats or risk of a physical
search, in part because this meaning follows so naturally from both our
use of the term secure as well as from its historical use and
etymology, 238 and because it so nicely captures why dog sniffs should
fall under the Fourth Amendment search provision.
1. Security Applied to Dog Sniffs
A dog sniff can undermine one's security depending upon the type.
When a drug dog sniffs a person, the suspect will naturally feel insecure
235. Seeid.at350-51.
236.
237.

14 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 851 (2d ed. 1989).
WEBSTER, supra note 233, at 66.

238. "Secure" likely has roots in the Latin se secures, "without care." See THE OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 236, at 851.
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that the dog will touch the person or pry his nose into hidden places,
especially between the legs. 239 In this case trespass means battery-an
offensive, unconsented-to touching. A person will also fear that the dog
will bite him, and this fear is far from unreasonable. As noted in the
Introduction, many dogs are cross-trained to detect drugs as well as to
apprehend suspects. 240 Dogs apprehend suspects by biting their arms,
legs, or other available body parts. As the Eleventh Circuit explained,
these repeated bites can lead to serious injuries. 241 No doubt in most
cases the dog will not bite the suspect, but a suspect's reasonable fear
that it will, significantly undermines his security because he reasonably
apprehends danger.
Even a motorist will suffer significant apprehension of danger. If
the driver exits the car, he experiences the same problem described
above. If the driver remains in the car, the window will often be left
open during his talk with the officer. A dog sniffing for drugs will likely
242
stick its head through the open window or perhaps jump into the car;
even if it does not, the driver will feel the apprehension of danger from
an itchy German Shepherd sniffing near the window.
With cars and homes, people will also experience another
apprehension: that the dog will alert, leading to a full-blown search. The
subsequent search will enjoy the endorsement of probable cause, but the
sniff itself retains an indissoluble link to the potential search in the
suspects' minds. It is this scenario that most challenges current Supreme
Court doctrine. The Court currently separates the dog sniff from the
eventual full-blown search that may result; they are separate inquiries.243
That is, it does not matter how the police establish probable cause-if
they have, they may search anywhere in the car that the drugs might be
239. See, e.g., Doe v. Renfrow, 451 U.S. 1022, 1023 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) ("[T]he police dog pressed forward, sniffed at her body, and repeatedly pushed
its nose and muzzle into her legs.").
240. See supratext accompanying notes 42-44.
241. Kerr v. City of West Palm Beach, 875 F.2d 1546, 1550 (11 th Cir. 1989). Justice Tjoflat
stated that:
Under the bite and hold method of training, a dog seeks to subdue a suspect by
biting his arm or leg; if, however, the dog has no access to such an appendage, the dog
will bite the suspect on any available area of his body. Upon being bitten by a dog, a
suspect usually attempts to free himself; the dog, however, is trained to maintain his hold
on the suspect ....

[I]f the dog should lose his hold ... the dog will seek to reestablish

it. As a result, suspects often suffer serious injury from multiple bites received during the
course of an apprehension.
Id.
242. United States v. Lyons, 486 F.3d 367, 370 (8th Cir. 2007) (describing how a dog stuck its
head into a car window left open by the driver); United States v. Stone, 866 F.2d 359, 361 (10th Cir.
1989) (describing a dog that jumped in an open hatchback).
243. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408-09 (2005).
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found. The Court does not take into account the intrusiveness of this
second search when evaluating whether a dog sniff counts as a search. If
the Fourth Amendment only protects against actual physical invasions,
or intrusions upon privacy that reveal personal information, then the dog
sniff is not a search, and the subsequent full-blown search occurs with
the blessing of probable cause.
But when we assume that secure under the Fourth Amendment
means free from the fear or anxiety of a full-blown search and not
simply free from the search, then we begin to see how the dog sniff must
incorporate to some extent what will happen if the dog alerts.
Of course, not every police tactic that might establish probable
cause can for that reason alone be considered a search. If the police
observe a person committing a crime, that observation would not be a
search. If the police question a person about whether he had committed a
particular crime, that questioning would also not count as a search.
These tactics lead to probable cause, but they do not involve conduct
that already constitutes a search in normal parlance. That is, when the
police look for something in a place protected by the Fourth Amendment
using a device-dog, drug test, or breathalyzer-that will create
probable cause almost per se, then that situation presents sufficient threat
of a full-blown search to count as a search itself. No one is secure in his
car or home with this imminent threat looming.
B. Dignity
The Fourth Amendment protects dignity,244 and like security,
dignity bears a close relation to area or place. For example, the Supreme
Court has expressly said that the police commit a far greater intrusion
upon a person's Fourth Amendment privacy when they touch or frisk the
person, or touch or squeeze the person's luggage, as compared to a
visual inspection-likely because the physical invasion into a protected
area intrudes upon the person's dignity as much as their privacy.245
The value of dignity becomes most clear in connection with the
integrity of the person. In Terry v. Ohio,246 the Court approved police
stop and frisks on less than probable cause, but took into account that
police often used such stops to humiliate people, especially minorities.
"This is particularly true in situations where the 'stop and frisk' of

244. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 337-39 (2000); Skinner v. Sec'y of Ry. Labor Execs.
Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 613-14 (1989); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966); John D.
Castiglione, Human Dignity Underthe FourthAmendment, 2008 Wis. L. REV. 655, 674-75 (2008).

245.
246.

See, e.g., Bond, 529 U.S. at 337-39.
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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youths or minority group members is 'motivated by the officers'
perceived need to maintain the power image of the beat officer, an aim
sometimes accomplished by 'humiliating anyone who attempts to
undermine police control of the streets.',, 247 The Court also held that stop
and frisks in general exact a significant toll on the dignity of the suspect:
"it is simply fantastic to urge that such a procedure performed in public
by a policeman while the citizen stands helpless, perhaps facing a wall
with his hands raised, is a 'petty indignity.' ' 248 Instead, it may inflict
"great indignity. 2 49
In Bond v. United States,250 the Court applied similar reasoning to
luggage. In that case, a border patrol agent entered a Greyhound bus at a
check point to check immigration status, and while there, felt each
passenger's luggage in the overhead compartment.2 5' When he squeezed
25 2
defendant's luggage, he felt a brick and asked for consent to search it.
Having received consent, the agent searched and found a brick of
meth.253 The question was whether the initial squeezing constituted a
Fourth Amendment search.
The Court found there was a search and suppressed the evidence,
holding that squeezing the luggage violated a reasonable expectation of
privacy.254 In answering this question, it focused in particular on the
grave intrusion upon a person's dignity, noting that squeezing luggage,
like frisking a suspect, "may inflict great indignity and arouse strong
resentment. ,25' True, the Court held that the incursion upon dignity
arose from the physical invasion, as opposed to a visual inspection,2 56
but the general point remains: we determine whether conduct counts as a
search in part by determining whether the tactic impinges upon dignity.
Earlier, I discussed the drug testing cases and showed how similar
they are, how similarly binary, to the dog sniff situation. 257 It is,

therefore, significant that in the leading drug and alcohol testing cases,

247. Id. at 14-15 n.11 (quoting LAWRENCE P. TIFFANY ET AL., DETECTION OF CRIME:
STOPPING AND QUESTIONING, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, ENCOURAGEMENT AND ENTRAPMENT 47-48

(1967)).
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
omitted).
256.
257.

Id.at 16-17.
Id.at 17.
529 U.S. 334 (2000).
Id. at 335.
Id. at 336.
Id.
Id.at 338-39.
Id. at 337 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968)) (internal quotation marks
Id.
See supra Part Ill.
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Schmerber v. California2 8 and Skinner, the Court has referred to dignity
as a Fourth Amendment value. In Schmerber, the police took a drunk
driver to the hospital, where medical personnel took his blood to test for
alcohol.259 After saying the Fourth Amendment protects privacy and
dignity, the Court said of the blood draw that the "interests in human
dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any
such intrusions on the mere chance that desired evidence might be
obtained. ' 260 In the end, the Court in Schmerber held that probable cause
to believe that the person was drunk sufficed to make such a blood draw
and test reasonable.2 61
Skinner similarly held that the Fourth Amendment protects
dignity. 262 In applying this standard to a requirement that certain railroad
employees produce a urine sample for drug testing, the Court hinted that
such a procedure impinged upon their dignity. It referred to the "visual
or aural monitoring of the act of urination," and said that there are few
activities "more personal or private than the passing of urine. 263
The premise that the Fourth Amendment guards against humiliation
and incursion upon dignity also follows from one of the key historical
precedents that led to the Fourth Amendment in the colonies,
Paxton's Case.2 64 In 1760 Boston, the authorities sought to reinstate the
writs of assistance, which would grant local customs officers and their
deputies complete discretion to search any house they chose for
contraband.265 Wealthy Boston merchants hired James Otis, Jr. to argue
the writs were unlawful.
In his famous argument against these writs, Otis made numerous
arguments, including technical statutory arguments that the writs were
not authorized by law. But perhaps his most moving lines came when he
emphasized how the writs would degrade the dignity of those searched.

258. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
259. Id. at 758.
260. Id. at 767, 769-70.
261. Id. at 768-71.
262. Skinner v. Sec'y of Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 613-14 (1989) ("The
Amendment guarantees the privacy, dignity, and security of persons against certain arbitrary and
invasive acts by officers of the Government .... ").
263. Id. at 617 (quoting Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir.
1987)).
264. See CUDDIHY, supra note 97, at 377-402 (2009) (calling Paxton 's Case "a landmark in the
law of privacy" (quoting Richard B. Morris, The CurrentStatesmen 's PapersPublicationProgram:
An Appraisalfrom the Point of View of the Legal Historian, 11 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 95, 97 (1967)
(internal quotation marks omitted))).
265. Id. at 378-81; John Adams, Petition of Lechmere (Argument on Writs of Assistance), in 2
LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, 144-47 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965)
(reproducing a draft writ of assistance).
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He largely cast this argument in the form of class, that the lowly customs
agent's assistants, whom he called "their menial servants," and "servant
of servants," could at their discretion search the entire home and "may
and everything in their way" in a "wanton exercise
break locks, bars
26 6
power.,
of. ..
What initially lies implicit in his argument-the impropriety of a
person from low station searching the home of an upper class
merchant-becomes more express when Otis provides a vivid example
from recent experience. A criminal defendant, Mr. Ware, appeared in
court for breach of the Sabbath day and profanity.267 When the
proceeding had finished, Ware commanded the judge to permit him,
under a writ of assistance, to search his house for uncustomed goods,
saying, "I will shew [sic] you a little of my power., 268 Ware went on to
search the house "from the garret to the cellar., 269 In the end,
Otis lost the argument, the court issued the writs, and the use of these
writs for general searches created continuing friction between England
and the colonies.27 °
Today, we would disagree that the type of humiliation Otis
described-a person from lower orders searching the home of a
merchant-warrants particular protection, but, at a more general level,
Otis established the principle that we need protection against unlawful
general searches pursuant to unfettered discretion because such searches
humiliate the person searched.
Dignity might be difficult to apply to concrete cases, but we can
gain additional purchase on the concept by considering its obverse:
humiliation or degradation.27' Of course, the Fourth Amendment does
not protect all individual dignity in all possible permutations; it does not,
for example, stop an incumbent President from running campaign ads
that humiliate and impinge the dignity of his opponent. To be a search,
we must have some government conduct that involves, for example, an
investigation of an area. When the police engage in an investigation that
involves what in ordinary language would be a search-such as a dog
sniff of a home, a car, or a person-we should treat such a tactic
266. Adams, supra note 265, at 142.
267. Id.at 143.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 145.
271. Castiglione, supra note 244, at 695. Castiglione defines dignity in part based upon the
conduct that intrudes upon it; and conduct that is demeaning, degrading, or humiliating, following
R. George Wright, who similarly defines dignity by its obverse. R. George Wright, Dignity and
Conflicts of Constitutional Values: The Case of Free Speech and Equal Protection, 43 SAN DIEGO
L. REV.527, 532-34 (2006).
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as a search protected by the Fourth Amendment, because it also raises
the precise dangers of humiliation implicated by more traditional
physical searches.
In other words, when we try to render concrete the harms from
searches of an area that do not reveal personal facts, we can rely upon a
concept of dignity. When a border patrol agent squeezes luggage
searching for drugs, he will often learn nothing about the interior of the
luggage. When a police officer frisks a suspect on the street, he may
similarly learn no personal facts about the suspect. Nevertheless, in both
because they have
cases, the authorities have conducted a search, in part,
272
imposed so thoroughly upon the person's dignity.
1. Dignity Applied to Dog Sniffs
How does dignity apply to the binary search doctrine and dog sniffs
in particular? Different scenarios present different levels of intrusion.
First, when the police direct a dog to sniff a person, even without
contact, this conduct seems most intrusive of dignity, and most
analogous to a frisk. Even if the dog does not alert and, therefore, reveals
nothing about the person-including no private fact-the direct sniff of
a person creates alarm, as well as humiliation; the sniff fails to respect a
person's personal, physical autonomy and intrudes upon his sense of
personal dignity. It is difficult to maintain one's sense of worth or
importance as a police dog sniffs one's person.
The courts have been divided over whether the dog sniffs of the
person count as a search.273 Most cases involve students, and most predate Caballes.The Seventh Circuit found no search, even when the dogs
sniffed very close to students' bodies and pressed their noses into their
legs.274 The Fifth Circuit held that a dog sniff of passengers exiting a bus
was not a search as long as the dogs did not come too close-four feet in
that case.2 75 The Fifth Circuit also held that dog sniffs of students, at
least where there was contact, was a search.276 The Ninth Circuit held
that dog sniffs of students from "close proximity," even without actual
contact, were searches.277
272. I say "in part" because both a frisk and the squeezing of luggage involve physical
invasions, and at least the latter now counts as a Fourth Amendment search under the holding of
Jones, as well as the privacy rationale of Bond. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012);
Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 337-39 (2000).
273. See Katz & Golembiewski, supranote 232, at 777-85, 787-88 & n.202, 789-91.
274. Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91, 94 (7th Cir. 1980) (Swygert, J., dissenting) (disagreeing
with the majority holding that a dog sniff ofall 2780 students was not a search).
275. United States v. Reyes, 349 F.3d 219, 221-22, 224 (5th Cir. 2003).
276. Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 479 (5th Cir. 1982).
277. B.C. v. Plumas Unified Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d 1260, 1266 (9th Cir. 1999).
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The Fifth and Ninth Circuit cases that found the dog sniffs to be
searches were civil rights actions brought by students, rather than
individual criminal cases and, therefore, had the benefit of extensive
testimony of innocent children describing the fear and humiliation they
felt as the dogs persistently sniffed, and often falsely alarmed to the
students' persons.278 The courts had little choice but to recognize the
gravity of the intrusion.
These cases holding the close dog sniffs of a person to be Fourth
Amendment searches, based primarily on the fear and indignity of the
search, make sense, but contradict the pure binary search doctrine
announced by Caballes. After all, Caballes urges courts to assess
whether the dog sniff reveals any private fact other than contraband, and
ignores the importance of the area searched. Justice Souter in dissent
argued that the majority's holding would permit wholesale sniffs of
pedestrians on sidewalks.27 9 But, common sense and the holdings of B.C.
2 80 and Horton v.
v. Plumas Unified School District
Goose Creek
2
81
Independent School District
show that the sanctity of the area
searched-in these cases the person-does matter. As with the drug
testing cases, we can and should extend this lesson to other protected
areas such as the car and the home.
The level of intrusion and humiliation involved when a dog sniffs
the exterior of a car obviously ranks lower than a dog sniffing a school
child's legs as she is pinned against the school hallway. Nevertheless,
the sniff involves the same type of humiliation and incursion upon
dignity as an ordinary physical search and should, therefore, be subject
to Fourth Amendment regulation. In addition, the procedure will likely
attract the notice of passers-by, whether on foot or in cars, subjecting the
person to additional public humiliation.
As for the home, the Jardines case itself presents an even starker
example. There, both federal and state governments deployed teams of
law enforcement personnel along the street on which Jardines
lived, conducting hours of surveillance of his home with several
officers going onto his porch.2 82 One of those officers brought a drugsniffing dog, which alerted, leading to a warrant and a full-blown search
of the home.283

278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

See id. at 1262, 1267; Horton, 690 F.2d at 473-74, 479.
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410-11 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting).
192 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 1999).
690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982).
Jardines v. State, 73 So. 3d 34, 37, 46,48 (Fla. 2011).
Id. at 46-48.
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The Florida Supreme Court held that the entire procedure
constituted a search, in large part because of the extensive and public
deployment of officers along the street and directly in front of Jardines'
home invaded a reasonable expectation of privacy. 2 4 In examining why,
the court identified the direct harms of the intrusion itself, including
humiliation and embarrassment.28 5 The harm arose, the court said,
because the conduct would be viewed by neighbors as an "official
accusation of crime. 286 This accusation, if Jardines were aware of it,
would contribute to any humiliation he might feel; even if not, it would
certainly damage his reputation and count that way as a direct harm, one
identified by Prosser as protected by the right to privacy.2 87
On the other hand, dog sniffs of cars in a parking lot do not raise
problems with humiliation or incursion upon dignity because the person
is not present. Such searches, however, raise the problem of dragnet
searches, addressed below.
C. Dragnet Searches
As Justice Souter pointed out in his dissent, nothing in the principle
of Caballes forbids the police from conducting dragnet searches of every
car in a parking garage, and every pedestrian on a sidewalk. Since
Caballes, the authorities have increasingly used drug dogs in dragnet
searches, they have become "increasingly common in public schools" in
parts of the Northeast.289 Those searches include dogs sniffing school
lockers and parking lots at random for drugs.29 °
In some ways, dragnet searches of lockers or cars in a parking lot
avoid certain Fourth Amendment problems, including humiliation, as
discussed above, and the racial profiling of individuals. Dragnet searches
may still present a risk of racial profiling by neighborhood or school,
however, and when police departments act unregulated by any Fourth
Amendment scrutiny, we will have little knowledge as to whether such
neighborhood-wide discrimination occurs.

284. Id. at 48.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 392-98 (1960). Prosser divides
the right to privacy into four categories, including the right against public disclosure of private facts,
and it is this category, which, in his view, protects reputation. Id.One could easily characterize this
more as a downstream harm that arises not directly from the intrusion upon the person's seclusion
but as a result of that intrusion becoming public.
dissenting).
288. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 411 (2005) (Souter, J.,
289. Schweber, supranote 19, at 3.
290. Id.
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But aside from the danger of racial profiling of neighborhoods,
dragnet searches independently raise Fourth Amendment problems
because they involve tactics that simply involve too much scrutiny. Our
knowledge that the police may direct dogs to our cars, lockers, or any
other possession in a wholesale fashion deprives us of any feeling of
security in those areas. The innocent possessor probably presents the
best concrete demonstration. Imagine we lived in a world where the
police conducted dog sniffs of all houses and apartments regularly,
though randomly. If a person lives alone, he can take reasonable steps to
ensure his apartment has no drugs in it and, thereby, has some control
over whether a dog alerts leading to a full-blown search. But, if he has a
roommate, he would need to constantly monitor whether his roommate
has drugs. Similarly, anytime anyone gets into his car, he would have to
search the passenger to ensure they do not have drugs. It quickly
becomes clear that such dragnet searches would make all of us unduly
suspicious of our friends, family, colleagues, and anyone else we share
space with.
D. DiscretionandRacial Profiling
Finally, the dog-sniff jurisprudence may produce a risk of racial
profiling. The open discretion afforded police will allow them to choose
which neighborhoods or which individuals to subject to dog sniffs
without any Fourth Amendment regulation. But the use of dogs can lead
to racial bias in another, subtler way: do the police who handle the dog
have an unconscious racial bias, an unconscious belief that a person of
color is more likely to possess drugs? If so, do they communicate that
unconscious belief to their dog, causing the dog to alert falsely? This
Part will consider this latter problem of unconscious racial bias.
As for the first question, extensive research has shown that
everyone has some degree of implicit racial bias, and for many people it
can play a significant role in the conclusions they draw. 29 ' Those studies
show the police are more likely to suspect blacks or Hispanics of
criminal activity than whites based upon the same external conduct.292
The studies establish this bias both in the laboratory with controlled
experiments, as well as by examining hit rates for officers.293 With
respect to the latter, studies show that the police find contraband up to

291. See, e.g., L. Song Richardson, Police Efficiency and the FourthAmendment, 87 IND. L.J.
1143, 1146-5 1 (2012) (collecting studies).
292. See id
293. Id.
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half as often on blacks as on whites, suggesting that they are more likely
to suspect black people because they are black.294
The statistics for drug sniffs are sparse, in part because there is no
Fourth Amendment regulation of them. But, the Chicago Tribune
recently conducted a study of traffic stops and drug dogs that gave way,
at least, to the inference of profiling Hispanic drivers. 295 The false alerts
for Hispanic drivers were far higher than for other drivers, a disparity
that could be explained by dogs that alert not to drugs but to cues from
their handlers who, in turn, have preconceptions that Hispanics are more
likely to possess drugs in their cars.29 6 Admittedly, this survey merely
demonstrates a risk of ethnic bias; after all,297the same survey did not
appear to show a bias against black motorists.
The second step requires us to show that dog handlers communicate
their belief that a person possesses drugs to their dogs, leading to false
positives. This premise was strongly confirmed in 2011 in a rigorous,
double-blind laboratory study.29 8 The study used 18 handler/dog teams,
each certified by a law enforcement agency to detect drugs or
explosives. 299 None of the target scents actually contained drugs or
explosives, yet the dogs falsely alerted to an astounding degree. The
experiment included 144 separate runs, and a dog might alert more than
once per run. 300 The dogs falsely alerted at least once in 85% of the runs,
and there were overall 225 alerts, again, all false.30 1
But the experimenters tested handler cues by telling the handlers
that those scents marked with red paper did indeed contain a drug or
explosive (when they did not in reality).30 2 The dogs were far more
likely to alert (falsely) for those scents that the handler already believed
were truly drugs or explosives.30 3 The authors considered the possibility
294. L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV.
2035, 2037-38 & nn.9-19 (2011) (surveying hit rates from Minnesota, Los Angeles, New York,
Illinois, Rhode Island, Missouri, and West Virginia); see also Floyd v. City of New York, No. 08
Civ. 1034, 2013 WL 4046209, at *24 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2013) (finding that racial profiling in New
York City's stop and frisk program from 2004 through 2009, was based, in part, on a lower hit rate
for contraband for blacks than whites (eight percent lower)).
295. Hinkel & Mahr, supra note 232, § 1, at 1 (three years of data for suburban police
departments showed dog alerts accurate forty-four percent in general, but only twenty-seven percent
for Hispanic drivers).
296. See id.§ 1,at 10.
297. Seeid.§l,atl.
298. Lisa Lit et al., Handler Beliefs Affect Scent Detection Dog Outcomes, 14 ANIMAL
COGNITION 387, 389-90 (2011).
299. Id.at 388.
300. Id.at 390.
301. Id.
302. Id.at 389-90.
303. Id. at 391.
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that the handlers claimed the dogs alerted when they did not simply
because the handler believed the scent was positive, but ultimately
concluded that it is more likely the dogs alerted based upon
unconscious cues from the handlers. 304 Either way, the dog alert resulted
from the handler's beliefs and not the dog's actual detection of the
contraband scent.
Putting together the robust research on implicit racial bias among
police officers with the strong showing that dog handlers communicate
their beliefs to their dogs, which alert falsely, we find a significant risk
that the use of drug-sniffing dogs could lead to racially discriminatory
searches. But, this problem does not mean we must abandon the use of
dog sniffs. Rather, the results suggest that we take measures to regulate
it, including bringing the practice under Fourth Amendment scrutiny.
After all, the same studies that identify implicit racial bias also suggest
that training can help officers avoid it. If officers can use dog sniffs
without any regulation, implicit bias will remain a risk; but, if the Fourth
Amendment (or statutes) require safeguards similar to those used in
traffic stops-with the addition of the type of training proposed in the
implicit bias literature-the risk of racial bias can be reduced.
VI.

FURTHER RAMIFICATIONS-HASH VALUES

The binary search doctrine, or at least the model of privacy that
focuses almost exclusively on facts, can lead to other potentially
troubling incursions upon Fourth Amendment interests. I will consider
one technique here: the use of hash values to search computer memory.
Binary searches of computers present a pure form of a binary
search, because they truly can disclose the presence or absence of
contraband only without revealing other information, and often, with
almost no physical intrusion whatsoever. Currently, law enforcement
uses binary searches chiefly to discover child pornography, and those
who possess and distribute it. Numerous off-the-shelf computer
programs-such as FTK by AccessData Group or Encase by Guidance
Software-can compute a "hash value" for any computer file. A hash
value has two key attributes. First, for any given hash value, the chances
that any two files will share that hash value is "astronomically small. 3 °5
For the MD5 hash algorithm, the chance is 1 / (2A 128) or roughly one
chance in 3.4 x l0^38, and for the SHA-1 algorithm it is 1 / (2A 160) or 1
/ (1.4 x 10A48).306 In other words, if two files share the same hash value,
304. Id.at 392-93.
305. Salgado, supra note 29, at 39.
306. Id. at 39 n.6.
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they are copies of the same file. Law enforcement has compiled hash
values for known images or videos of child pornography, and can
simply compare those hash values to the hash value for a file on a
computer to determine one thing, and one thing only: whether that file is
child pornography.
The second attribute of a hash value is that it is one way.307 The
authorities cannot take a hash value and reverse engineer it to obtain the
original file. Thus, when law enforcement determines the hash values of
files on a person's computer, those hash values are meaningless and
cannot be used to determine what the original file was-unless
compared to hash values of known files. True, in theory the authorities
could compare hash values of a person's files to known hash values of
files that are not contraband, and thus, learn their content,
but this possibility also exists for dogs, which can be trained
to smell things other than drugs. But assuming law enforcement
compares the hash values only to known child pornography, then it can
conduct a pure binary search, a computer analysis that will disclose
nothing but child pornography.
A hash value search for known child pornography seems to be a
pure binary search that should be permitted under Caballes. °8 The
search discloses nothing other than the presence or absence of
contraband-far more accurately than a drug-sniffing dog. The search,
therefore, should not count as a Fourth Amendment search. Yet, courts
addressing such hash value searches, even after Caballes, have been
reluctant to so hold.
For example, in United States v. Crist,30 9 a landlord cleared out the
possessions of his tenant, including a computer, which eventually fell
into the hands of someone who found a small amount of child
pornography. 310 This person turned the computer over to the police, who
performed a hash value analysis, which disclosed numerous other files
of known pornography. 311 The Court held that running the hash values
on the hard drive was a Fourth Amendment search.3 12

307. Id.at 40.
308. Id. at 45-46 (arguing the Court's dog sniff cases would allow authorities to search hard
drives for known child pornography without a warrant). But see Hofnann, supra note 30, at 21-23
(arguing that the use of "hash" evidence obtained without a warrant would violate the Fourth
Amendment).
309. 627 F. Supp. 2d 575 (M.D. Pa. 2008).
310. Id.at 577.
311. Id. at 577-79.
312. Id. at585-86.
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A concurrence by Chief Judge Alex Kozinski in the Ninth Circuit
made a similar pronouncement, albeit in dicta:
[T]he government has sophisticated hashing tools at its disposal that
allow the identification of well-known illegal files (such as child
pornography) without actually opening the files themselves. These and
similar search tools should not be used without specific authorization
in the warrant, and such permission should only be given if there is
probable cause to believe
313 that such files can be found on the electronic
medium to be seized.
The issue remains largely undecided, however, because in the vast
majority of court cases, law enforcement has searched a peer-to-peer
network for child pornography, using hash values, and when it discovers
a hit, it traces the file back to the computer (and person) offering that
file.314 These cases do not question whether the initial search of the peerto-peer network constitutes a search, because those networks are offered
to the public.31 5 However, the "explosion" of child pornography
identified by the Justice Department3 16 may well lead to more aggressive
efforts to discover child pornography, including conducting binary
searches with hash values randomly, even on hard drives owned by
people who wish to keep them secret.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Court's overreliance on a model of privacy that protects facts
only has led it to discount the important value of seclusion in an area; a
value protected by privacy, as well as the Fourth Amendment principles
of security and dignity. The dog-sniff cases are the chief culprit; dog
sniffs of cars for drugs do not count as Fourth Amendment searches.
Cases such as Caballes, thus, leave unregulated the quickly growing use
of such dogs, not only with cars but also with schools and homes. The
Court's recent holding in Jardines does little to remedy this problem,
since it relied entirely upon a trespass rationale involving police entering
the front walk and porch of a house, whereas the vast majority of

313. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1179 (9th Cir. 2010)
(Kozinski, J., concurring).
314. See, e.g., United States v. Cobb, No. 11-12390, slip op. at 3-4 (1lth Cir. May 24, 2012);
United States v. Miknevich, 638 F.3d 178, 182-85 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Wellman, 663
F.3d 224, 226 (4th Cir. 2011).
315. State v. Daigle, 93 So. 3d 657, 665 (La. Ct. App. May 2, 2012).
316. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CHILD EXPLOITATION
PREVENTION AND INTERDICTION: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 2, 8-27 (2010).
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residential dog sniffs involve police validly entering common hallways
of apartment buildings. 317
The search-free conclusion of the binary search doctrine could also
lead to other more widespread searches, such as scans of every hard
drive in America for contraband such as child pornography. Since such a
scan would reveal nothing but the presence or absence of contraband, it
should not fall under the Fourth Amendment if we accept the binary
search doctrine. The doctrine could also permit the authorities to test a
home's sewage for drugs; such a sewage test would reveal nothing but
the presence or absence of contraband and, thus, could be used without
any suspicion in dragnet fashion or to target and harass individuals. If
the results are positive, they could provide probable cause for a
wholesale search of the home for drugs.
These situations share a notion of privacy rooted solely in
protecting facts. The only fact revealed concerns contraband and, thus,
does not establish a right to privacy, undermining any Fourth
Amendment protection. But this Article has shown that the right to
solitude or seclusion-recognized for a century in tort law and
eloquently elaborated on by privacy scholars such as Gavison 3 18provides another model of privacy. Privacy rooted in seclusion
shields areas-such as cars and homes-from dog sniffs simply to
protect that seclusion.
Beyond privacy, a view of "secure" in the text of the Fourth
Amendment adds additional perspective. When we remember that secure
includes, amongst its meanings, free from apprehension of danger, we
can develop a Fourth Amendment notion of secure that includes a fear of
imminent physical invasion. A dog sniff fits this expectation nicely
because a positive alert, at least outside a car, will almost certainly lead
to an immediate full-blown search involving a physical invasion. Even
with the home, where the police must obtain a warrant, they are almost
certain to do so in reaction to a positive alert, making the eventual
physical invasion inevitable, if not immediate.
From the modest dog sniff we have developed a richer view of
privacy, of the Fourth Amendment, and of law enforcement-one that
embraces values beyond personal information. The dog sniff reminds us
of the complexity of the Fourth Amendment, and the variety of its
sources and values.

317. See supra Part IB. 1.
318. See supra Part IV.B.
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